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1.  INTRODUCTION
After failure to agree at the end of the Uruguay  Round, and after reaching an interim  agreement  in July
1995, the negotiations  on financial  services  in the context  of the General Agreement  on Trade in
Services  (GATS)  were finally concluded  in December 1997. The largest service sector, including
banking, insurance  and other financial  services,  was now fully  subject  to multilateral  trade rules. Not
only did the agreement  consolidate  the relatively  open policies  of industrial  countries  which account for
much of world trade in financial  services, it also elicited  wide participation  from both developing
countries  and countries  in transition.
This paper studies  the commitments  on financial  services  that have been made by close to one hundred
developing  countries  and all the Eastern European  Members  of the WTO.  Earlier research  by Kono et
al. (1997), Sorsa (1997) and Kono  and Low (1996)  took stock of what had been achieved  by July 1995.
This paper first updates and deepens  the previous analyses  of commitments,  and then examines  some
of the economic  implications. The next section  describes  how financial  services  fit into the GATS
framework,  and examines  whether  broader economic  concerns  justify limiting  the scope of
commitments. Section  III analyses  the pattern of market access  commitments  of the developing
countries  and countries  in transition. Section  IV examines  the relationship  between  the GATS
commitments  and the domestic reform  process. Section  V discusses  the economic  implications  of
allowing  foreign  participation  through equity  ownership  in existing  financial  institutions  rather than
through new entry. Section  VI concludes  the paper.
22.  THE GATS  FRAMEWORK  AND FINANCIAL  SERVICES  LIBERALIZATION
No attempt  is made here to provide a comprehensive  picture of the GATS and how it works.'  Rather,
brief mention is made of those features  of the Agreement  that are relevant to the discussion  that
follows. The GATS  covers all measures  taken by Members  affecting  trade in services and all service
sectors. 2 The Agreement  is unusual in taking  a wide view of what constitutes  trade, and defines  trade
in services  as the supply of a service  through any of four modes. Mode 1 deals with cross-border
supply  of a service, which is analogous  to international  trade in goods, in that a product (service)
crosses  a national  frontier; e.g. the taking of a loan or the purchase of insurance  cover by a consumer
from a financial  institution  located  abroad. Mode 2 involves  consumption  abroad, including  the
movement  of consumers  to the territory of suppliers; e.g. the purchase  of financial  services  by
consumers  while  travelling  abroad. 3 Mode 3 is of crucial  significance,  and entails the commnercial
presence  of a supplier  of one Member  in the jurisdiction  of another  Member; e.g. when a foreign  bank
or other financial  institution  establishes  a branch or subsidiary  in the territory of a country  and supplies
financial  services. By defining  trade to include  sales through commercial  presence, the Agreement
includes  in its domain  foreign direct investment,  which accounts  for a large share of all services
transactions,  particularly  in financial  services. Mode 4 covers the supply of services  through the
presence  of natural persons, e.g. independent  financial  consultants  or bank managers, of one Member
'For fuller treatments of GATS, see Hoekman (1995), Low (1995) and Mattoo (1997).
'The  only explicit sectoral exclusion from GATS is certain "hard'  rights in the aviation sector.
3However, the Explanatory Note on Scheduling Commitments (GATT Document GNSIMTN/W/164) gives examples of Mode 2
which do not necessarily involve the physical movement of the consumer to the location of the supplier - for instance, when a
consumer's  property alone moves abroad, as  in the case of  ships being repaired abroad.  This creates some fuzziness in the
distinction between Modes 1 and 2.
3in the territory of another Member.
Certain GATS obligations  apply across-the-board,  while others depend  on the sector-specific
commitments  assumed  by individual  Members. The first of the important  general obligations  is
transparency  which requires inter alia that each Member  publish  promptly "all relevant  measures  of
general application"  affecting  trade in services. The second is the most-favoured-nation  (MFN)
principle  which prevents  Members  from discriminating  among  their trading partners. The Agreement,
however, permits Members  to list temporary  exemptions  to MFN. 4 In the case of financial  services,  a
number  of MFN exemptions  had been maintained  when the preceding round of negotiations  were
concluded  in mid-1995,  some of which reserved  the right to apply reciprocity  as a basis for granting
market access. 5 One of the key objectives  of the extended  negotiations  was to achieve  the removal of
such exemptions  and reach a full MFN-based  result.
The liberalizing  content of the GATS depends  on the extent and nature of sector-specific  commitments
assumed  by individual  Members. The core provisions  of the GATS in this context relate to market
access (Article  XVI) and national treatment  (Article  XVII). These  provisions  apply only to sectors
explicitly  included  by a Member  in its schedule  of commitments  and there too are subject  to the
limitations  that a Member  has scheduled. It is worth emphasizing  that GATS commitments  are
4The  exemptions are subject to review and should, in principle, not last more than ten years.
'  Among them was the MFN  exemption of the United  States,  which  reserved the  right to discriminate  between trading
partners with respect to new entry or the expansion of existing activities, in order to "protect existing activities of United States
service  suppliers  abroad  and  to  ensure  substantially  full  market  access  and  national  treatment  in  international  financial
markets."  See Key (1997).
4guarantees, and the absence  of such guarantees  need not mean that access  to a particular  market is
denied. In fact, as will be shown later, there are several markets  where conditions  of access  are more
liberal than those bound under the GATS.
The market  access provision prohibits  six types of limitations,  unless they have been inscribed  by a
Member in its schedule. These are:  (a) limitations  on the number of suppliers; (b) limitations  on the
total value of service  transactions  or assets; (c) limitations  on the total number  of service operations  or
on the total quantity  of service  output; (d) limitations  on the total number of natural persons  that may
be employed; (e) measures  which restrict or require specific  types of legal entity or joint venture; and
(f) limitations  on the participation  of foreign  capital. In scheduled  sectors, the existence  of any of these
limitations  has to be indicated  with respect  to each of the four modes of supply, described  above.
National  treatment  is defined  under Article XVII in the traditional  GATT manner, as treatment  no less
favourable  than that accorded  to like domestic  services and service suppliers. In contrast to the GATT
approach, however, Members  may inscribe  limitations  on national  treatment  in their schedules  - with
respect  to each of the four modes of supply, as in the case of the market access  provision. 6
GATS commitments and wider policy  concerns
Is there reason for Members to hold back on GATS  commitments  in order to retain the freedom  to
6 The main reason why negotiators eschewed the GATT approach of making national treatment an overarching principle of
general application, is because granting market access with full national treatment would have been the equivalent of
establishing free trade,  whereas governments wanted the option of adopting a more gradual and conditioned approach to
opening up their markets.  Some have suggested that it may be desirable to replicate a goods-like regime in services with full
national treatment and bound taxes on foreign providers which would be progressively negotiated down.
5pursue certain  policy objectives? The following  discussion  shows  that commitments  under GATS  need
not compromise  the ability  of governments  to pursue sound  regulatory  and macroeconomic  policies and
leave them considerable  freedom  to achieve  other domestic  policy objectives.'
First consider  prudential  regulation. In financial  services,  specific commitments  are made in
accordance  with the Annex on financial  services  which complements  the basic rules and definitions  of
the GATS taking into account  the specific  characteristics  of financial  services. Of particular
significance  is Paragraph  2(a) which states that:
Notwithstanding  any other provisions  of the Agreement,  a Member  shall not be
prevented from taking measures  for prudential  reasons, including  for the protection  of
investors,  depositors,  policy holders or persons  to whom a fiduciary  duty is owed by a
financial  service supplier, or to ensure the integrity  and stability  of the financial  system.
The same  paragraph  goes on to say that where prudential  measures  do not conform  with other
provisions  of the GATS, they must not be used as a means of avoiding  commitments  or obligations
under the Agreement. 8 Nevertheless,  regulators  would  seem to have considerable  discretion  in their
choice of prudential  measures  - especially  since  no definition  or indicative  list of such measures  is
provided in the Annex. 9
'See Kono et al. for a more detailed discussion (1997).
8This language differs from and is weaker than that in Article XIV dealing with General Exceptions in that it does not require
that the measures be necessary to achieve the stated objectives.
9 Such measures presumably include capital adequacy requirements, restrictions on credit concentration or portfolio allocation,
and disclosure and reporting requirements, as well as licensing criteria imposed on financial institutions which are not more
6Consider now macroeconomic policy in general.  When a central bank conducts open market
operations, for example,  conditions  in the financial  sector could  be affected  through the impact  of such
interventions  on the money supply, interest rates or exchange  rates. It is notable that services  s.upplied
in the exercise  of governmental  authority, including  activities  conducted  by a central  bank or monetary
authority  or by any other public entity in pursuit of monetary  or exchange rate policies, are excluded
from the scope  of the GATS.  Furthermore,  a wide range of measures  for macroeconomic
management,  such as reserve requirements  on banks, could presumably  be justified as measures  to
ensure the integrity  and stability  of the financial  system  under the terms of the Annex on Financial
Services.
How far do GATS  commitments  oblige a Member  to allow capital  mobility? GATS rules on this
subject  can be summarised  as follows. If a Member  undertakes  a market access  commitment  in relation
to the cross-border  supply of a service  and if the cross-border  movement  of capital is an essential  part
of the service itself, that Member  is committed  to allow such movement  of capital. Furthermore, if a
Member  undertakes  a market access commitment  in relation  to the supply of a service through
commercial  presence, that Member is committed  to allow related  inflows  of capital into its territory.
Thus, Members do not have any obligations  with respect to capital flows  related to consumption
burdensome  than necessary  to ensure  the solvency  and the healthy  operation  of those  institutions. As Kono and Low (1997)
argue,  the continuing  process  of regulatory  harmonization  and enhanced  cooperation  between  financial  regulators  and
supervisors  in the context  of the BIS (Bank  for International  Settlements)  and IOSCO  (International  Organization  of Securities
Commissions)  as well as in other international  fora provide  useful background  in maintaining  discipline  in the introduction  and
implementation  of prudential  measures  based  on this provision.
"Under Article  1:3  of the GATS  and the Annex  on  Financial  Services.
7abroad, and with respect to capital  outflows  related to commercial  presence. 1"  Furthermore,  the
Agreement  also allows  a Member to impose  restrictions  on current or capital  transactions  in the event
of serious  balance-of-payments  and external  financial  difficulties  or the threat thereof (Article  XII).' 2
Finally, consider  the other domestic regulations that governments  maintain,  which are not prudential  in
nature, but which nevertheless  can affect the conditions  of operation  and competition  in a market.  Such
measures  could include, for example, a requirement  to lend to certain sectors or individuals,  or lending
mandated  on the basis of preferential interest  rates. Even though such measures  may not be the most
efficient  means  of achieving  particular  objectives,  these policies  are not necessarily  subject  to
commitments  made under the GATS. If they are neither discriminatory  nor intended  to restrict the
access  of suppliers  to a market, then such domestic  regulatory  measures  would be permitted  provided
they met certain basic criteria, such as impartiality  and objectivity  (specified  in Article VI of the
GATS). 3
3.  MARKET ACCESS  COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES
11  This can be inferred by reading Article XI, the provision on international payments and transfers together with footnote 8 to
Article XVI, the market access provision.
'2Article XII stipulates that the restrictions shall not discriminate among Members,  shall be consistent with the Articles of
Agreement of the Fund, and shall be temporary and be phased out progressively as the situation improves.
'3There has often been concern about the potential for selective servicing by foreigner suppliers.  It is feared that the latter will
only service profitable market segments and that the resulting underprovision of retail banking in rural areas,  for example, could
then have detrimental effects on the economy.  It would seem possible under  GATS to impose certain requirements, such as
universal service obligations, as part of licensing requirements provided these do not discriminate between foreign and domestic
financial institutions. Social objectives could then be met without sacrificing the efficiency benefits of competition.
8This study focuses  on the commitments  of 105  developing  and transition  country Members  of the
WTO." 4 The countries  are divided into  four geographical  groups: Africa (41 countries, 1.5 per cent
share of all Members' GDP), Asia and the Pacific (25 countries,  7.6 per cent share), Eastern Europe (7
countries  1.1 per cent share), and Latin America, including  the Caribbean (32 countries, 6.2 per cent
share).
The GATS Schedules  of commitments  are complex  documents,  containing  for each Member, market
access,  national  treatment  and additional  commitments,  on up to sixteen sub-sectors  of financial
services," 5 with respect to each of the four modes. In order to capture the essential  elements  of these
commitments  without  complicating  the analysis  unduly, this paper focuses  on the following:
(i)  Within insurance, on direct insurance,  both life and non-life, and within  banking  and other
financial  services, on acceptance  of deposits  and lending  of all types.  These services  constitute
the core of the financial  services  sector. Although  securities-related  services  are of increasing
importance  in developing  countries,  they are excluded  from the current study for reasons  of
4At the time of writing, the WTO had a total membership of 132.  Members account for 95 per cent of world GDP. China and
Russia are two major countries which are not yet Members.
'5Financial services under the GATS consist of insurance services and banking and other financial services.  Insurance services
encompass direct  insurance (life and non-life), reinsurance and retrocession,  insurance intermediation,  and auxiliary insurance
services (including consultancy, actuarial, risk assessment and claim settlement services).  Banking and other financial services are
defined under GATS to include acceptance of deposits,  lending, financial leasing, payment and money transmission services,
guarantees and commitments, trading (in money market instruments, foreign exchange, derivative products, exchange rate and
interest rate instruments, transferable securities, and other negotiable instruments and financial assets), participation in issues of
securities, money broking, asset management, settlement and clearing services, provision and transfer  of financial information
(including data processing), and advisory and intermediation services.
9space.
(ii)  On the first three modes, cross-border  supply, consumption  abroad  and commercial  presence.
The fourth mode, the presence of natural persons, may be less important  in this sector, than in
others, such as professional  services. The commitments  of countries  on the fourth mode are, in
any case, almost  uniformly  limited  to the intra-corporate  transfer of managers, executives  and
specialists.
(iii)  Market  access commitments: Given the structure  of the GATS and scheduling  practice, the
extent of guaranteed  liberalization  depends  crucially  on the commitments  to provide  market
access. These commitments  determine  whether  foreign  services and service suppliers  are
assured  of the right to enter the market. Furthermore,  any measures  inconsistent  with both
Article XVI (market access)  and Article XVII (national  treatment)  are scheduled  in the market
access  column of the schedule  in accordance  with Article XX:2.' 6 Finally, most of the entries
in the national  treatment column  are highly  correlated  with those in the market access  column:
liberal market access commitments  are frequently  accompanied  by full national  treatment
commitments,  and vice versa." 7
In examining  the level of commitments,  three distinctions  are made. These are between full bindings,
" 6It is not always clear from the entries in the market access column which measures simultaneously constitute limitations on
national treatment.  Furthermore, the extent to which a limitation in the market access column affects the commitment in the
national treatment column is also debatable.  For a discussion of these issues, see Mattoo (1997).
'7Hoekman (1995), in his study of all Uruguay Round commitments, found that share of sectors for which the liberalization
values for market access and national treatment were the same, was 89% for high income countries and 96% for other countries.
10designated  as a "none" entry against  a particular  mode of supply in the schedule, denoting  the absence
of any limitations; no bindings, which are designated  "unbound"  against  the relevant  mode; and the
intermediate  case of "limited"  bindings,  which refer to those entries  which are conditioned  in some way
by a limitation. The limitation  may be on coverage (sectoral,  geographical,  or modal), or in the form
of a restrictive  measure  (which can be one or more of the six types of restrictions  listed in Article
XVI). Many Members impose  restrictions  on the legal form of commercial  presence, requiring, for
instance,  presence in the form of locally  incorporated  entities  rather than branches. In the following
analysis,  it is assumed  that such restrictions  are less burdensome  than those which limit entry or the
extent of foreign  equity participation." 8
I Some Members appear to have inscribed prudential measures and other regulatory interventions in the schedules of specific
commitments.  An example is the frequent appearance of approval or authorization requirements which do not belong in the
schedules if they are only meant to ensure that sound financial institutions enter the market.  The paper attempts to make the
sometimes difficult distinction between measures that restrict market access and/or national treatment, and therefore should be
included in schedules, and those that pursue public policy objectives of a non-restrictive nature and should therefore be
excluded from schedules.
11a.  Insurance
The results of the analysis  are presented in Tables 1, 2 and 3 19 As Table 1 shows, over half the
countries  in the group being studied,  accounting  for 95 per cent of the GDP of non-developed
Members, made commitments  on direct insurance  services. In both numerical  and GDP-weighted
terms, country  participation  was highest in Eastern Europe, where all WTO Members made
commitments. Participation  was lowest in Africa, where, out of 41 WTO Members, only 13 made
commitments  - but the participating  countries  accounted  for four-fifths  of African  Members' GDP.
Similarly,  in Latin America, commitments  were made by 18 (out of 32) countries, and in Asia, by 17
(out of 25) countries,  but the participants  accounted  for more than 95 per cent of each region's GDP. 20
Before  plunging  into a more detailed  description  of the pattern of commitments  in direct insurance, we
present an overview  of their liberalizing  content, based on a particular approach  to numerical
estirnation  (Table 2).  (The estimates  for the individual  countries, as well as the assumptions  underlying
these estimates,  concerning  the relative importance  of the modes of supply  in specific  sub-sectors  and
the relative restrictiveness  of different  measures,  are presented in Annex 1.) For the group of countries
being studied  here, the average value of the liberalization  index in insurance is not high - a little less
than one-half  (compared  with an average of around 0.70 for the group of developed  countries),  where 0
represents  no commitments  on any of the modes and I represents  fully liberal  commitments  on all
9 Tables showing individual country commitments can be obtained from the author.
20All percentages are calculated by using the sum of the GDP of all countries in the region which are WTO Members.  Thus,
China's GDP, for instance, does not enter the calculations.
12three. 2'  The commitments  of African  and Eastern European  Members  are more liberal  than the all-
country  average. African  Members' are placed ahead of the Eastern Europeans  because of their
willingness,  in general, to make liberal commitments  not only on commercial  presence, but also on the
first two modes. The commitments  of the Asian  Members, while less liberal  than the average, were
significantly  more liberal than those of the Latin American  Members.
There are significant  differences  between individual  participating  countries in the extent of binding and
the restrictiveness  of scheduled  limitations  (Tables  2 and 3).  Full liberalization  across all three modes
is rare.  Out of the 52 countries who  made commitments  on direct insurance, only 4 small countries,
Bahrain, Gambia,  Guyana and the Solomon  Islands, together accounting  for less than one-half  per cent
of participants' GDP, committed  to removing  all barriers. The only exception  to the relative paucity of
liberal  commitments  on the first two modes was Africa, where 5 countries, including  relatively large
Egypt  and South Africa, guaranteed  an absence  of restrictions  on consurnption  abroad. 22 Otherwise,
there was also hardly any evidence  that countries  were more willing  to make fully liberal commitments
with respect to consumption  abroad  than to cross-border  supply. 23
21 The regional GDP weighted indices are generally lower than the simple averages, suggesting that within each region smaller
countries have tended to be more forthcoming in liberal commitments than the larger countries.
22Several  countries such as Hong Kong, Israel, Malaysia, Peru do not allow soliciting or advertising under cross-border supply
and consumption abroad.
23There are several reasons to expect more liberal commitments on consumption abroad than on cross-border supply.  First,  it
could have been presumed that governments would be less concerned (or less able to do anything) about transactions which take
place outside their jurisdiction than those which take place within their jurisdiction.  Secondly, as noted above, while commitments
on cross-border supply carry  the obligation to  allow any essential movement capital,  those on consumption abroad  do not.
However, the lack of a clear distinction between the two modes may have made government's choose a cautious approach to
scheduling.
13In each of the regions, commercial  presence  is clearly the mode through which Members  prefer to
guarantee  access to domestic  markets for direct insurance  services. As many as 19 countries,
accounting  for nearly a quarter of participants'  GDP, guaranteed  the absence  of restrictions  (other than
on legal form) on commercial  presence. Even though this is not evident from the numerical  summary,
Eastern Europe  as a region represents  potentially  the most liberal market for foreign investment  in
direct insurance. The markets  of 2 Members  are already free from significant  restrictions: Poland
(only limitations  on the investment  abroad  of insurance  funds)  and Romania  (partnership  is required
with Romanian  legal or natural persons). The restrictions  in several other countries  are transitory. In
Bulgaria, supply  by foreign majority  owned firms will be allowed  three years after accession. The
Czech and Slovak  Republics  shall endeavour  to eliminate  or reduce  the scope of their monopolies  for
certain  types of compulsory  insurance. 24 In Slovenia,  branches  are not allowed, and foreigners  may not
participate  in the privatization  of state-owned  insurance  companies,  but the only restriction  on new
entry through subsidiaries,  a 99 per cent limit on foreign  equity, will soon  be eliminated. In Hungary,
branches  are currently not allowed, but legislation  permitting  them is being prepared. Even though
Hungary  has listed an MFN exemption  based on reciprocity  with respect  to commercial  presence, it is
24 The Czech  and Slovak  Republics  are among  the Members  that have  undertaken  commitments  using  the Understanding  on
Commitments  in Financial  Services. This document  provides  a standardized  list of liberalization  commitments,  including  inter
alia a general  standstill  commitment  with respect  to non-conforming  measures,  the granting  of the right to establish
commercial  presence  to foreign financial  service  suppliers,  and a commitment  to endeavour  to eliminate  monopoly  rights  in
financial  services  or reduce  their scope. Among  the countries  being studied  here, Nigeria, Turkey, Bulgaria,  Hungary  and Sri
Lanka  (for banking  and other  financial  services  - excluding  insurance)  have also used  the Understanding  as a basis for their
commitments.
14not clear whether  this would affect access  to its market given its otherwise  liberal commitments.'
Next in degree of openness  is Africa, where 7 out of the 13 countries, including  Nigeria and South
Africa, accounting  for two-thirds of participants' GDP, impose  no restrictions  other than on the legal
form of commercial  presence. 26 Egypt, Gabon and Mauritius  apply economic  needs tests or
discretionary  procedures  in allowing  new entry, while Morocco  has included  a reciprocity  condition in
its schedule. Egypt is perhaps the only country  in these negotiations  which has specified  the basis for
carrying out an economics  need test and has committed  to relaxing the test in future. Egypt, Ghana and
Kenya (in life insurance)  impose  equity  limitations  but Ghana and Kenya already allow  majority  foreign
ownership. Egypt  currently limits foreign  equity to 49 per cent, but will raise the limit to 51 per cent
in the year 2000 for life and 2003 for non-life  insurance.
The number  of assurances  of fully open markets for foreign  investors  is higher in Asia and the Pacific
(7 out of 17) than in Latin America  (3 out of 18). Furthermore,  several relatively  large Asian markets
(including  Hong Kong, Indonesia,  Israel and Turkey, accounting  for 32 per cent of Asian  participants'
GDP) have no significant  restrictions  on the establishment  of foreign comnmercial  presence, but this is
only true for the smaller Latin American economies  (Guyana,  Panama and Paraguay, accounting  for
only 1 per cent of Latin American  participants'  GDP).
The nature of restrictions  in place in the two regions reveal an interesting  difference: the Latin group
seems primarily  reluctant  to guarantee  free entry, whereas the Asian group seems reluctant  also to
25Since  Hungary  has also scheduled  commitments  according  to the Understanding  on Commitments  in Financial  Services,  it has
undertaken  to grant  financial  service  suppliers  of other  Members  the right  to establish  commercial  presence  on an MFN  basis.
26South  Africa,  for instance,  requires  local incorporation.
15assure full foreign  ownership. In the Latin group, eleven Members  (including  Argentina,  Brazil and
Chile) 27 do not assure fully liberal  entry conditions  (i.e. unbound,  subject  to discretionary  licensing,
limitations  or reciprocity  conditions),  two Members  (Cuba and Mexico) 28 impose  only equity
limitations,  and two (Dominican  Republic  and the Honduras)  both.  In the Asian group, entry
limitations  are accompanied  in eight cases (including  India 29, Malaysia,  Philippines  and Thailand)  by
restrictions  on foreign  equity as well, one Member (Korea 3') imposes  only equity limitations  whereas
just one Member  (Qatar) imposes  only limitations  on entry. The implications  of these differences  are
discussed  more fully in a subsequent  section. However,  the contrast  between regions may be less stark
than it appears  because  the discretion  that Latin American  countries  retain to impose  conditions  on new
entry could also apply to foreign equity participation.
" 7 Argentina  has indicated that authorization of the establishment of new entities is suspended while Chile has indicated that the
supply of financial services through commercial presence may be subject to an economic needs test.  Brazil has indicated that the
enactment of a Presidential decree is required to establish commercial presence.  Such a decree is apparently necessary to overcome
the constitutional barriers to the establishment of foreign enterprises and has reportedly served to facilitate entry.  Nevertheless, in
so far as there seems to be a need for a political decision to grant entry, the commitment cannot be regarded as fully liberal.
28 "n  Cuba's case, the foreign equity limitation is listed in the horizontal commitments and applies to all sectors.  In Mexico's
case,  the equity limitation is aggregate for the whole sector rather than  for  a single enterprise, but  Mexican control of each
enterprise is required.
29India is, in fact, the only participant in direct insurance which has left the commercial presence mode completely unbound.  It,
therefore, retains the discretion to impose any Article XVI restriction, including on entry and foreign equity.
30Korea does not limit the foreign equity in new direct investment.  However, it has indicated in its horizontal commitments,
which apply to all sectors, that the acquisition of outstanding stocks of existing domestic companies is restricted.  Furthermore,
foreign portfolio investment in Korean  stocks is permitted only for  the stocks listed on the Korean  stock exchanges.  While
individual foreign investors can own up to 6 per cent of each company's total stock, aggregate foreign investment in each company
cannot exceed 23 per cent.
16b.  Banking
The results of the analysis are presented in Tables 1, 4 and 5.  It is evident from Table  1 that there
were more commitments in core banking services than in insurance:  nearly two-thirds of the countries
in our study group,  accounting for 97 per cent of the GDP of non-developed Members, made
commitments on the acceptance of deposits and lending of all types.  Again, in both numerical and
GDP-weighted terms, country participation was highest in Eastern Europe (all WTO Members made
commitments) and lowest in Africa (18 countries out of 41, accounting for 84 per cent of the region's
GDP).  But African participation in banking, as well as that of Asian and Latin American countries,
was higher than in insurance.
We begin again with an overview of the liberalizing content of commitments, based on our numerical
estimates (Table 4). The average value of the liberalization index for banking for the developing and
transition countries is not high - a little over one-half (compared with an average of around 0.75 for the
group of developed countries).3  Again, the smaller countries have generally tended to be more
forthcoming in liberal commitments than the larger countries.  As in insurance,  the commitments of
African and Eastern European Members are more liberal than the all-country average while those of
the Asian and Latin American Members are below average.  But there are some notable differences
from the pattern in insurance.  While Africa again leads in openness for the acceptance of deposits, it is
second to Eastern Europe in openness for lending. And in banking, it is the Latin Americans which
have on average made more liberal commitments than the Asians.
31 Although the value of the index for banking is slightly higher than that for direct insurance, the difference is not statistically
significant.
17The variation  within  participating  countries  in the extent of binding  and the restrictiveness  of scheduled
limitations  is again evident (Tables 1 and 5).  Full liberalization  across all three modes is slightly  less
rare in banking  than in insurance. The 10 countries  which have guaranteed  virtually  unconstrained
access  by all modes of supply, however account  for only 1 per cent of participants' GDP and include
only the smaller  economies: 5 are in Africa (Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique  and Sierra Leone),
2 in the Pacific (Papua New Guinea and the Solomon  Islands)  and 3 in the Latin American  group
(Guyana,  Haiti and Panama).
The number  of liberal  commitments  on the first two modes was significantly  higher than those in
insurance. Over half of the Asian  participants  (including  Hong Kong, Indonesia,  the Philippines  and
the UAE)  committed  to liberal consumption  abroad, and nearly one-third to liberal  cross-border  supply
(including  Indonesia  and several smaller  economies). In Africa, nearly half the participants  guaranteed
unrestricted  access  by each of the first two modes, but in Eastern  Europe and Latin America, very few
Members were prepared to do so.  Only in Asia was there any evidence  that countries were more
willing  to make liberal  commitments  with respect to consumption  abroad than cross-border  supply.
The number of fully liberal commitments  for foreign investors  in banking (mode  3) were on the whole
comparable  to those in insurance: 26 participants,  accounting  for over a fifth of participants' GDP.
However, the regional  pattern was different. Asia was the only region where fewer countries  assured
full openness  under mode 3 than under each of the first two modes. In all other regions, the pattern in
insurance  was more or less repeated, with commercial  presence  being the relatively  most liberalized
mode. The numerical  summary  (Table 1) reveals  that 5 out of the 7 countries  of Eastern Europe,
accounting  for 79 per cent of regional participant's  GDP, already represent the most liberal markets as
18far as commercial  presence is concerned. In Slovenia,  there is an element  of discretion  in licensing 32
and foreigners  may not participate  in the privatization  of state-owned  insurance  companies,  but the
former  restriction  is to be removed  after the adoption  of a new Law on Banking. Hungary's
reciprocity-based  MFN exemption  with respect to commercial  presence  prevents its market from being
classified  as fully open.
Again, it is Africa which is next in degree of openness,  with 10 out of the 18 countries, accounting  for
78 per cent of the region's GDP, guaranteeing  virtually  unconstrained  rights of commercial  presence.
In addition  to the countries  which impose  no restrictions  on any mode (named  above), Egypt, Lesotho,
Nigeria, and South  Africa are fully open to investment. 33 Among  the less open markets are Benin,
Gabon, Mauritius  and Tunisia which apply  economic  needs tests or discretionary  procedures  in
allowing  new entry, and Zimbabwe  which imposes  a 60 per cent limit  on foreign  equity. Morocco
applies  a reciprocity  condition  to commercial  presence  as well as discretionary  limits on foreign  equity
participation. Gambia is the only country  which has left the commercial  presence  mode unbound in the
core banking  services.
The number  of countries which guarantee  free access  to foreign investors  is higher in Latin America
than in Asia and the Pacific -reversing  the picture in insurance. In Latin America, the 8 such markets
(including  Argentina,  Panama and Paraguay)  account for a fifth  of the regional participants' GDP,
whereas the 3 such markets in Asia and the Pacific (Israel, Papua New Guinea and the Solomon
32The Schedule  states that the Bank of Slovenia  shall, when considering  issuing  a license, take into account  inter alia "the
national  economic  preferences  for certain  banking  activities."
33Egypt  imposes  no restrictions  on  joint venture  banks, other  than the requirement  of approval  for individual  share ownership
above certain limits, but it does impose an economic needs test on the branches of foreign banks.
19Islands)  account  for only one-twentieth  of the regional  participants'  GDP.  However, the nature of
restrictions  in place in the two regions mirrors that in insurance. In the Latin group, 9 Members
(including  Chile, Colombia, Peru and Venezuela) 34 impose  only entry restrictions  of some form (either
unbound,  limited, subject to discretionary  licensing  or a reciprocity  condition), I Member  (Mexico)
only equity  limitations  (aggregate  for the sector), and 2 (Brazil 35 and the Dominican  Republic)  both.
In the Asian  group, entry limitations  are accompanied  in 10 cases (including  India 36, Indonesia,
Korea 37, Malaysia,  Pakistan 38, Philippines  and Thailand)  by restrictions  on foreign equity  as well, 1
34Chile  and Colombia  both apply an economic  needs test for commercial  presence.  Peru has indicated  in its horizontal
commitments  that mode 3 is unbound  except  for certain  aspects, while Venezuela  has indicated  a reciprocity  requirement  in its
schedule. Both  Peru and  Venezuela  have  also  listed  reciprocity-based  MFN  exemptions.
31In Brazil's case the discretionary element is more explicit in banking than in insurance.  Its commitment states that the
"establishment  of new branches and subsidiaries of foreign financial institutions, as well as increase in the participation of foreign
persons in the capital of financial institutions incorporated under Brazilian law, is only permitted when subject to a case-by-case
authorization by the Executive Branch, by means of a Presidential decree."
36Since India allows entry only through branches (restricted to 12 per annum), this amounts to a prohibition on foreign equity
participation.
37The inclusion of Korea in this category may need some explanation.  The foreign participation restrictions specified in Korea's
horizontal commitments apply to banking as they do to insurance.  The situation with respect to new entry is less clear.  The
relevant text states that "only branches of foreign banks which rank among the world's top 500 banks in terms of assets size or
representative offices are permitted."  It is not clear whether presence in the form of banking subsidiaries is allowed (particularly
since the text in insurance explicitly mentions that subsidiaries are permitted.)  Furthermore, it is not clear whether the restriction
of branching rights to the top 500 banks should be considered a prudential measure given the performance of certain banks in this
category.  In any case, these issues may soon cease to be relevant if Korea's recent liberalization measures, discussed below, are
reflected in its schedule.
3"In addition to stipulating  foreign equity limitations, Pakistan has included a reciprocity condition in its schedule, and also listed
20country  (Bahrain)  imposes only equity limitations  whereas  4 (including  Hong Kong 39 and the UAE)
impose  only limitations  on entry.
Another difference  is the frequency  in Asia of numerical  restrictions  on branches  of foreign  banks.  In
Latin America, several countries,  such as Colombia  and Costa Rica, do not allow entry through
branches  but most (with the exception  of Brazil and Venezuela)  do not impose  any subsequent
restrictions  on the scale of operations. Interestingly,  India is the one country which allows entry only
in the form of branches  of foreign  banks licensed  and supervised  as banks in the home country. This
may reflect  the desire  to shift the regulatory  and supervisory  burden to the home country.
4.  THE ROLE OF GATS IN THE DOMESTIC REFORM PROCESS
The rest of this paper addresses  two questions. First, how does the level of conimitments  made by
countries  under the GATS  relate to and affect their actual  policies? Secondly,  does the pattern of
liberalization  implied  by the commitments  reflect socially  desirable choice of policy? This section
considers  the first question,  the second is dealt with in the next section.
A notable feature of the negotiations  in fmancial  services is that they did not take place in the usual
an MFN  exemption  based  on reciprocity.
39Hong  Kong imposes  no restrictions  on lending. However,  in order to obtain  a full banking  license  for the acceptance  of
deposits,  the financial  institution  "must  have been an authorized  institution  for at least ten years and be closely associated  and
identified  with HKSAR."  Furthermore,  acquisition  of an existing  locally incorporated  bank by an overseas  bank requires  the
consent  of the Monetary  Authority.
21context  of a multi-sectoral  and multi-issue  round of negotiations. Although  this had, of course, been
the original intention,  failure to complete  the negotiations  before the end of the Uruguay Round
effectively  turned financial  services  into a single-sector  negotiation.  This tended to divide countries  into
those that looked  for export gains and those whose  focus could  only be the conditions  of competition  in
the domestic  market.  Despite  the absence  of any possibility  for cross-sectoral  trade-offs,  or for
improvements  in the policy environment  facing exports for those without export  potential  in financial
services,  we have seen that many governments  being studied  here did make new commitments.40
One reason for the willingness  of governments  to make liberalization  commitments  may well have been
the realization  not only that liberalization  was a good idea, but that the WTO offered a useful
instrument  for consolidating  and promoting  liberalization,  as well as defining  and tying down future
liberalization  plans in a legal sense. Many developing  countries  may also have seen WTO
commitments  as a way of signalling  their seriousness  to potential  foreign investors  and strategic
partners. However,  the relatively  low level of liberalization  commitments  from many developing
countries  suggests  that the arguments  for making  commitments  were tempered  by other  considerations,
some of which are discussed  below.
In broad terms, governments  have adopted  three different  approaches  to the financial  services
negotiations, assuming that they participated at all.  These are:  (i) to bind the status quo, which may
40But several  countries,  including  Hungary,  Mauritius, Pakistan,  Peru, Philippines  and Venezuela,  maintained  MFN
exemptions  in their schedules  which state that access  may  be granted  on a reciprocal  basis. Given the structure  of the GATS,
regardless  of the MFN exemption,  the benefits  of specific  commitments  made  by these  Members  must be extended  to all other
Members  on a non-discriminatory  basis. Thus  the exemption  has meaning  only where  commitments  have not been  made, or
where  it is used  to provide  better treatment  to some Members  than specified  in their schedules.
22have been arrived at after liberalization,  either unilateral  or in the context of the negotiations; (ii) to
make binding  commitments  that represent  less than the status quo in policy terms; and (iii) to promise
future  liberalization,  which may or may not have been planned  prior to the negotiations. These
categories  are not necessarily  mutually  exclusive  when  the set of a country's commitments  is taken as a
whole, nor is it always easy to determine  the precise  category in which a policy position  should  fall.
The distinctions  are useful, however, in thinking  about the relationship  between  WTO negotiations  and
domestic  liberalization  processes.
a.  Binding the Status Quo
Governments  binding  at the status quo signalled  that existing  market conditions  are guaranteed. Even
though much greater knowledge  of national  regimes  than is available  would be required to make a
definitive  judgement, it would seem  that most of the commitments  made by countries  covered in this
paper were of the status quo variety. Consolidation  of the status quo clearly has positive  value, and it
is the easiest  thing for governments  to do while signalling  a positive intent and a commitment  to the
trading system. The pervasiveness  of status  quo bindings  has, however, been sometimes  held out as
evidence  of the failure of the GATS to generate  meaningful  liberalization. But it is important  to
recognize  that in many  cases, the status quo itself was reached after recent liberalization,  either
unilateral  or during the course of negotiations."4
The improvements  in commitments  by countries  since  the last round of negotiations  ended  in mid-1995
4 "The precise impulse  for liberalization  is difficult  to identify. In any case, as noted above, for most countries  studied  here,
there  were no immediate  benefits  in terms of improved  access  to foreign  markets,  so, in addition  to any foreign  political  pressure
and the promise  of future  rewards,  the motive  for liberalization  must  have  been  based  on  domestic  policy  considerations.
23provide  some idea of the extent of recent liberalization. 42 The clearest evidence  exists for the Eastern
European  countries. Several  (like the Czech Republic,  Slovak  Republic and Slovenia)  gave up the
possibility  of discretionary  licensing  in banking  based on economic  needs, while others (like the Czech
Republic  in air transport insurance)  eliminated  monopolies  in certain areas of insurance. Several
countries  (like Bulgaria in insurance)  allowed  commercial  presence through branches  while others
liberalized  cross-border  trade and consumption  abroad (like Poland with respect to insurance  of goods
in international  trade). Liberalizing  trends are also visible in other regions: some countries  (like Brazil)
replaced  prohibitions  on foreign  establishment  with a case-by-case  authorization  requirement  and some
liberalized  cross-border  trade (for instance, the Philippines  with respect to marine hull and cargo
insurance).
It is notable that many of the improvements  pertained  to relaxation  of foreign equity limitations. For
instance, Malaysia  agreed to raise foreign  equity limits in insurance  on incorporation  of existing
branches  (and for original owners who had been forced to divest)  from 49 per cent to 51 per cent.
Mexico raised its limits on foreign  participation  from 30 per cent of common stock to 40 per cent of
common  stock (plus 30 per cent and 40 per cent of non-voting  common  stock in insurance  and banking,
respectively),  Kuwait allowed  up to 40 per cent foreign  participation  in banks and Singapore  up to 49
per cent in local insurance  companies. Egypt  and El Salvador  completely  removed the limits on
foreign  ownership  of shares in banks (previously  at 51 per cent and 50 per cent, respectively). Ghana
removed  the requirement  that at least 20 per cent of the capital  of insurance  companies  be owned  by the
government  and allowed  foreign partners  to obtain management  control of local firms. Hong Kong
removed  a requirement  that made eligibility  for new full banking  licenses  contingent  on ownership
42Unless, of course, there was significant binding below the status quo in 1995, which Sorsa (1997) argues was the case.  This
Section relies on research by Masamichi Kono.
24predominantly by Hong Kong interests, and Kenya no longer requires that one-third of the equity in
non-life insurance companies be held by Kenyan citizens.
b.  Binding  Below the Status Quo
Several countries bound at less than status quo, at least with respect to certain aspects of their regimes.
The Philippines, for example, did so with respect to foreign equity participation in commercial banks:
binding at 51 per cent when domestic law allows 60 per cent. 43 Korea also stopped short of reflecting
in its GATS offer all the present and future liberalization commitments made at the OECD:  for
instance, in the GATS offer foreign portfolio investment in listed companies is bound at 23 per  cent,
but in the OECD Korea is committed to raising this ceiling progressively and eliminating it by the end
of the year 2000.44 While any binding at all provides an identifiable measure of security of market
access, the value of a binding at below status quo is attenuated by the scope it gives a government to
worsen existing conditions of market access without violating a GATS commitment. 45
43Where a binding involving foreign equity limitations is less than the level actually allowed to any investor subsequent to the
entry  into force of the commitments, the MFN principle will have the practical effect of "ratcheting up"  the equity limitation
commitment.  This is because a new entrant could demand the same level of equity participation on MFN grounds as that granted
to another supplier.
'Furthermore,  under the terms of the IMF agreement, the de facto regime with respect to foreign capital is already more liberal
than the GATS offer.  For instance, the new president Kim Dae-Jung was quoted as saying that "From now on there is no need for
discrimination between indigenous and foreign capital.  We are living in an era where foreign investment is more important than
foreign trade."  (Financial Times, 29 December 1997).
45See  Francois and Martin (1996) for a formal development of this argument in relation to tariff bindings.
25Why would  countries  choose to bind less than  the status quo? The econometric  study  by Mattoo  and
Schuknecht  (1999)  suggests  at least  two sorts of reasons. First,  domestic  macroeconomic  instability  and
regulatory  weaknesses  appear  to have had a negative  impact  on the level of commitments. Secondly,
membership  of international  trade coalitions,  such as the groups  of agricultural  and textile and clothing
exporters,  was in general  associated  with a lower level of commitments.  46 This suggests  that even small
countries  that do not have much  bargaining  power on their own in negotiations,  may  nevertheless  have
chosen  to retain bargaining  chips for future  multi-sectoral  negotiations  when they were part of trade
coalitions. Even  though such mercantilistic  bargaining,  and concern with reciprocity,  are often  judged
inappropriate  and damaging,  it is nevertheless  true that countries  could benefit additionally  if their
trading partners  were also to liberalize. 47 Furthermore,  from a political standpoint,  governments  may
be able to garner greater domestic support  for liberalization,  including  through building  cross-sectoral
coalitions,  if other governments  are liberalizing  in areas of their export interest at the same time.
The "grandfather"  provisions
One of the central  problems  in the negotiations  were solved by a scheduling  innovation. The conflict
arose because  certain countries  were unwilling  to make commitments  which reflected  the status quo
with respect to commercial  presence. Thus, they were either inclined  to bind foreign  ownership  levels
below those which currently prevailed,  or insist on legal forms (local incorporation)  other than those
currently in the market (branches),  or both.  The problem arose because  policy regimes  had become
more restrictive  than those that prevailed  when the incumbent  foreign firms first entered, e.g. in
Malaysia, where the indigenisation  policy  was being implemented  after the establishment  of many
"This  is probably  not true of the developed  country  members  of the Cairns  Group.
4'For an analytical  exploration  of some  of these  issues,  see  Bagwell  and Staiger  (1996).
26foreign firms. 48 The negotiated solution was to drive a wedge between the conditions facing firms
which were already present and those which would enter when the commitments came into effect.  In
effect, the privileged situation of existing firms was "grandfathered".'4
The three types of grandfathering provisions, foreign  equity-related, legal form-related  and general,
which are to be found in the financial services schedules are shown in Table 6.  It is evident that
grandfathering was primarily an Asian phenomenon.  The grandfathering provisions reflect the relative
emphasis in these negotiations on guaranteeing the rights of incumbents.  They provide the benefits of
security to investors who are already present in the market rather than to new investors.  Furthermore,
they may even place new entrants at a competitive disadvantage where differences in ownership and
legal form affect firm performance.  The welfare implications of guaranteeing the position of
incumbents in protected markets are considered in a subsequent section.
c.  Precommitment  to Future Liberalization
Finally, there is the question of the role of the GATS as a vehicle for promoting future liberalization.
One reason for the reluctance of governments to liberalize immediately is the perceived need to protect
the incumbent public/national suppliers from immediate competition  - either because of the infant
48 To see the nature of the problem, consider the following example.  Say country A had allowed a firm from country B to
establish a fully owned subsidiary in 1990.  If it made a specific commitment under GATS to allow commercial presence
through fully-owned foreign subsidiaries, then it would be obliged to allow firms from all Members to establish under similar
conditions.  The implied level of openness was apparently unacceptable for country A.  If, however,  market access was bound
only for, say, minority owned foreign firms, then the existing firm from country B would have no guarantee that it would not
one day be asked to disinvest.  Such an uncertain situation evoked significant concern in existing investors from country B.
49This  paper does not discuss the legal implications of the grandfathering provisions.
27industry  type of argument  or to facilitate  "orderly  exit". In the financial  sector, the vulnerability  of
domestic  suppliers  is related to a larger concern  about the stability  of the financial  system. The fear is
that inefficient  or otherwise  handicapped  domestic  banks, if exposed  to competition,  may fail and set
off a chain reaction  affecting  other financial  institutions.,
One reason for the failure of infant industry  policies in the past, and the innumerable  examples  of
perpetual  infancy,  was the inability  of a government  to commit  itself credibly  to liberalize  at some
future  date -- either because it has a stake in the national  firm's continued  operation, or because it is
vulnerable  to pressure from interest groups which benefit from protection. 5"  The GATS offers a
valuable  mechanism  to overcome  the difficulty  of making credible  commitments  to liberalize  -
commitments  to provide market access and national  treatment at a future date are binding under WTO
law. Failure to honour these commitments  would create an obligation  to compensate  those who are
5 'For  instance, the presence of too many financial institutions is sometimes cited as an argument against liberalization in financial
services trade.  To the extent that this reflects concern about the viability of individual financial institutions, it is best addressed
through prudential measures and measures to facilitate orderly exit from the market.  In Argentina, for instance, one quarter of the
country's 200 banks were liquidated in 1995 and 1996. See also Kono et al. (1997).
5 "National firms often behave as if they prefer to operate as high cost, poor quality producers in protected markets than as low
cost/high quality producers facing international competition. This may be because of the profitability of protection, or the greater
utility that managers and workers derive from operating in sheltered environments.  In any case,  when the government cannot
credibly commit itself to liberalize, then national firms may have an incentive to precommit to high costs or poor quality, in an
environment of slow learning and under-investment in research and development.  Such behaviour by the firm, either for strategic
reasons or on account of inertia, forces governments to prolong socially costly protection.  Related arguments have been made in
Staiger and Tabellini (1987) and Tornell (1991).
28deprived  of benefits. This need to compensate  does in fact make the commitment  more credible  than a
mere announcement  of liberalizing  intent in the national  context. A precommitment  to liberalize  can
also instill a sense of urgency in domestic  reform, and in efforts to develop the necessary  regulatory
and supervision  mechanisms.
Several governments  have taken advantage  of this mechanism  to strike a balance between,  on the one
hand, their reluctance  to unleash  competition  immediately  on protected  national  suppliers, and, on the
other hand, their desire not to be held hostage  to the weakness  of domestic  industry in perpetuity. India
and the Philippines  have committed  to allowing  an increased  number  of branches  rather to a change in
regime (Table 7).  The Czech and Slovak Republics  will endeavour  to remove or reduce the scope of
monopolies  in certain areas where insurance  is compulsory." Egypt  and Slovenia  will relax certain
elements  of discretionary  licensing, whereas Hungary, Poland and Slovenia  will allow  branches  of
financial  institutions  to operate. Bulgaria  and Egypt have committed  to allow majority  foreign
ownership  in insurance  in the near future, while  Thailand  has created a 10 year window  of opportunity
for foreign investors  to acquire higher equity shares  than the maximum  25 per cent normally  permitted
- subject  to the approval of the Ministry  of Finance. 53 The commitments  by Hungary, Slovenia  and
Brazil are interesting  in that they have been made contingent  on parliamentary  approval of new
legislation. This approval is not certain, but the current commitment  has value because there is an
obligation  immediately  to translate future  domestic  law into an international  commitment.
However, on the whole it must be said that the use of the GATS as a mechanism  for lending  credibility
52This  is by virtue of their subscription  to the Understanding  on Commitments  on Financial  Services.
"3The  recommendation  must come from the Bank  of Thailand  and the relaxation  must be  "deemed  necessary  to improve  the
condition  or business  of the commercial  bank".  This is one of the few instances  in the GATS of a temporary  liberalization
commitment.
29to liberalization  programmes  has been somewhat  disappointing. The result in financial  services
compares  unfavourably  with the experience  in the basic telecommunication  negotiations  (see Low and
Mattoo, 1997),  though it must be recognized  that financial  markets  are generally  much more
competitive  than those in basic telecommunications.  Again it is possible that many governments  were
reluctant to tie their hands in the environment  of financial  instability  in which the negotiations  were
concluded.
5.  INCREASED  COMPETITION  VERSUS FOREIGN  EQUITY  PARTICIPATION
As we saw above, the pattern of policy differs across regions. These  differences  reflect in part
differences  in political  attitudes  to foreign direct investment,  and varying degrees  of concern  about the
prospect  of foreign ownership  and control in financial  services. The political economic  reasons  for
these differences  are worth examining,  but here we focus on the economic  consequences  of different
combinations  of policy. The focus is on two aspects  of the commitments  undertaken: liberalization  of
entry into the industry  and increased scope for foreign ownership  (and/or control). How does the basic
conclusion  of the literature on privatization,  that it is increased  competion  rather than changes  in
ownership  which produce  major welfare  benefits, need to be modified in the present context?
First, consider  the impact  of GATS  commitments  on the degree of competition  in a market. A
multilateral  commitment  by a government  to allow entry influences  the degree to which markets  are
contestable. Regardless  of the existing  market structure, established  suppliers in the market are likely
to behave  more competitively  if the government  promises  to create no legal barriers to entry. And we
know that increased  competition  brings benefits  both through promoting  allocative  efficiency,  i.e.
pricing close to costs, and internal  efficiency,  producing  at least cost. Conversely,  privately  efficient
profit-seeking  behind  protective  barriers cannot  be expected  to lead to socially  efficient  results.
30In light of the emphasis in the GATS negotiations upon increasing permitted (or maintaining existing)
levels of foreign equity participation, consider the implications of a situation in which foreign
participation has been permitted without an increase in the degree of competition allowed to occur in
the market.  Foreign investment clearly brings benefits even in situations where it does not lead to
enhanced competition.  First,  allowing foreign equity participation may relax a capital constraint which
could otherwise result in socially suboptimal levels of investment in the sector.  Furthermore,  the
benefits of increased investment in helping to recapitalize troubled financial institutions in many
developing countries cannot be underestimated.  In fact, one reason why countries may have chosen to
restrict new entry while allowing foreign equity participation, is probably because they would like new
foreign capital to help strengthen weak domestic financial institutions rather than to come in the form of
highly competitive new banks and insurance companies which might drive their domestic rivals out of
business.  Second, foreign equity participation may serve as a vehicle for transferring technology and
know-how.  The benefits come not only in the form of technological innovations, such as new methods
of electronic banking, but also in terms of improved management and credit assessment techniques, as
well as higher standards of transparency and self-regulation.
Against these benefits, there may well be costs associated with foreign direct investment when
competition is restricted.  If foreign investment comes simply because the returns to investment are
artificially raised by restrictions on competition, then the cost to the host country may exceed the
benefits, because the returns to the investor will be greater than the true social productivity of the
investment (see Hindley and Smith,  1984). To some extent rent appropriation can, of course, be prevented
by profit taxation or by holding competitive auctions of licenses or equity. The rents would then accrue
either to the government or to existing national shareholders, but the static and dynamic inefficiencies
31consequent  upon  lack  of competition  would  still exist54
As noted above, in both insurance  and banking,  there is a tendency  among  Latin American  countries  to
impose  restrictions  on (or not guarantee)  entry, whereas in Asia, entry limitations  are accompanied  in
many cases by restrictions  on foreign equity as well. It is, of course, possible for competition  to come
through the other modes, cross border supply and consumption  abroad, where these  modes of delivery
are feasible. Here again, many more Asian  countries  have made liberal commitments  than Latin
American. It could be argued  that neither group has chosen the first best (at least in static terms) of
liberalized  entry conditions  for both domestic  and foreign entrants. But given the restrictions  on entry,
the Asian group's propensity  to impose  equity limitations  may reflect an attempt to strike a balance
between the benefits  and costs of foreign  equity in protected  markets. The Latin American  group, with
some exceptions,  seems to have revealed  a preference  for unconstrained  foreign equity  participation
even in the absence  of free entry conditions.
Could it be that the markets in these countries  are already so competitive  that liberalization  of further
entry would only have a limited  impact  on firm  performance? Evidence  presented in Sorsa (1997)
leads to the opposite  conclusion. She finds that crude concentration  ratios - defined as the share of the
largest bank in total banking  assets - are somewhat  higher in developing  and transition  markets  than in
industrial  countries. Hong Kong, Mexico,  Korea, Brazil and the Philippines  have low concentration
ratios whereas  Chile, Hungary, India, Israel, Morocco and Slovakia  have high ones. At the same time,
54Creating discriminatory profit tax regimes would have negative incentive effects on new foreign investment, but such regimes
are ruled out, of course,  where commitments are undertaken to provide national treatment.  Furthermore, while equity auctions
may prevent net profit transfers abroad through new acquisitions, and license auctions achieve the same vis-a-vis new entrants,
neither addresses appropriation by  existing foreign share owners.  In this  context,  the grandfathering commitments assume
particular significance.
32profitability  indicators  are found to be higher in many developing  and transition  markets than in the
OECD  countries. The 1994  data indicate  that South  Africa, Chile, Pakistan, Malaysia,  Thailand  and
Romania  had among  the most profitable  banking  sectors among  emerging  markets. These  high profits
may be symptomatic  of limited competition,  because  of restrictions  either on establishment  or the other
modes of supply. It is also relevant  that spreads  (lending  less deposit  rates) are found to be generally
higher in the developing  and transition  country  markets  than in industrial  countries, suggesting  that
there remains  scope for improving  efficiency  of financial  intermediation. 55 Finally, the share of foreign
assets in total financial  sector assets  was already  high in several countries. Poland, Egypt, Turkey,
Singapore  and Hong Kong already have shares of 20 per cent or more.
Since  the rent-appropriation  concerns  about  foreign direct investment  arise in imperfectly  competitive
situations,  one question  is whether  such market structures  are inevitable. While fully competitive
markets  may not exist where the optimal  scale of operation  is high, the high degree of concentration  in
certain countries  is almost  certainly a consequence  of the policy barriers to entry. Some of the possible
economic  reasons for such barriers have  been mentioned  above, and range from the inadequacies  of
domestic  regulation  to variants  of the infant  industry argument. But these arguments  for restricting
competition  must be temporary. Eventually,  it is sound prudential  regulation  and adequate  supervision
which must be guarantors  of the stability  of the financial  sector rather than economically  costly
restraints  on competition.
55The  difference in spreads could of course reflect a variety of factors, including differences in the risk premium.
336.  CONCLUSION
The financial  services  negotiations  under the GATS have contributed  to the creation of stable and
transparent  policy regimes  in many  developing  and transition  countries. However, even though  the
number of countries  that participated  in the eventual  agreement  was impressive,  the liberalizing  content
of commitments  was variable. In general, the African and Eastern  European  participants  made  much
more liberal  commitments  than the Asian and Latin American  participants. Given that there exist
adequate  safeguards  in the GATS to ensure that liberalization  commitments  do not threaten
macroeconomic  stability  or compromise  the ability  to pursue sound regulatory  policies, the reason for
the limited  commitments  may not be obvious. But to-those  familiar  with the mercantilist  nature of
WTO negotiations,  it is the fact that many countries  without  no export interest in financial  services
made any commitments  at all that is surprising. The outcome  probably  reflects the balancing  by each
participant  of the benefits  of unilateral  bindings against  the gain from retaining  bargaining  chips for
future  multi-sectoral  negotiations.
Two specific  aspects  of the commitments  also raise concerns. There has been less emphasis  on the
introduction  of competition  through new entry than on allowing  (or maintaining)  foreign  equity
participation  in existing  financial  institutions  and protecting  the position  of incumbents. In some cases,
the particular choice  of policies may have been forced  by the current financial  crisis - dictating  that
foreign  capital be allowed  to enter only as an injection  into weak domestic  industry rather than as new
competition. At the same time, few guarantees  have been made of competition  through cross border
supply, presumably  because  of concerns  about  regulatory difficulties  and the implied  capital mobility.
Lack of competition  is undesirable  in itself, but even more so when it provides an opportunity  for
foreign  rent appropriation. This does not imply  that countries  should impose  restrictions  on foreign
investment,  but rather that the benefits  to a country  from foreign investment  are likely to be greater if it
34does not impose  restrictions  on entry.
Even where immediate  introduction  of competition  was deemed  infeasible,  the GATS  has not been fully
utilised  to lend credibility  to liberalization  programmes  by precommitting  to future market access. It is
conceivable  that immediate  liberalization  was not desirable  because  domestic financial  institutions  and
regulators  were not equipped  to deal with a high degree of competition. But commitments  to liberalize
in the future would  have served to confront  domestic  industry  with a credible deadline  and domestic
regulators  with a clear timetable  to develop  the necessary  mechanisms  for prudential  regulation  and
supervision. While many governments  may have been unwilling  to tie their hands in the precarious
financial  situation  which prevails today, the commitments  themselves  could  have contributed  to creating
greater stability.56
This paper has concentrated  on the GATS commitments  of countries,  apart from the brief discussion  of
their relationship  to actual policies in Section  IV.  It is probable  that in many cases, commitments  under
GATS  reflect actual  trade policies (i.e. countries  simply  bind the status quo) but, as the discussion  in
Section  IV shows, this is not always true.  In particular, when a service is not listed in a Member's
schedule  or a specific  mode is unbound, schedules  provide no clue as to what actual  policies may be.
Further empirical  research is needed  to obtain a more comprehensive  picture of the policies
governments  actually  pursue with respect to the financial  sector. It should then be possible  to examine
more thoroughly  not only the determinants  of trade policy (such  as the conditions  in the domestic
financial  sector, the adequacy of regulatory  mechanisms,  and political  economy aspects) but also what
influences  the relationship  between  actual  policy and GATS commitments  (benefits  of binding versus
56There is no evidence, however, that in the financial crisis during the final months of the negotiations governments went back
on what they intended to do.
35the costs of giving  up policy flexibility  or negotiating  currency). Finally, more research is needed  to
study the impact  of trade policy choices  (both national  and in terms of international  commitrnents)  on
the performance  of the financial  sector and the economy  more generally. 57
57An example of recent research along these lines is the paper by Clessens and Glaessner (1997).
36ANNEX  1: NUMERICAL  ANALYSIS
This Annex takes  some preliminary  steps towards quantifying  the commitments  on financial  services
(building  on the approach  of Hoekman, 1995). To begin with, two issues  need to be addressed. The
first concerns  the relative importance  of the modes  of supply  in specific  sectors, and the second  the
relative restrictiveness  of different measures.
Modal weights
Available  statistics  do not enable a precise identification  of even revealed  patterns of trade by different
modes, let alone of patterns in the absence  of policy restrictions, which is what we are really interested
in.  The only country  which reports statistics  on establishment  trade on a regular basis is the United
States. These data are presented in following  table, along with data from balance-of-payments  statistics
which approximate  cross-border  trade.  In insurance,  establishment  trade is three and a half times
greater than cross-border  trade for imports,  and more than six times  as large as cross-border  trade for
exports. In banking  and securities services,  establishment  trade is three-and a half times greater than
cross-border  trade for imports  and more than twice as large for exports.
37Annex Table 1: United  States  Financial  Services  Trade  by Modes  of Supply', 1994
(IJS$  billion)
Mode 1: Cross-border  trade  Mode 3: Commercial  Presence
Exports  Imports  Exports  Imports
Insurance  Services 2 4.90  13.90  30.90  48.70
Banking  and Securities 3 6.10  1.70  14.00  5.90
Services
Source: Survey  of Current  Business  (1996,  November),  USITC  (1997)
'These  statistics  only  provide  an approximation  to trade through  the different  modes  of supply  defined  in the GATS.
2All trade figures  for insurance  services  are presented  on a gross basis, i.e., imports  comprise  premiums  paid for foreign
insurance  coverage  and exports comprise  premiums  received  from foreign  policyholders. No deductions  are made  for claims
received  from foreign  insurers  or payments  for foreign  claims  because  such statistics  are available  only  for cross-border  trade,
and not for establishment  trade.  Ideally, of course,  insurance  services  should  be valued  by service charges  included  in total
premiums  earned  rather than by total premiums.
3Banking  and securities  services  cover financial  intermediary  and auxiliary  services (except  those of insurance  enterprises  and
pension  funds). Included  are intermediary  service  fees, such  as those  associated  with  letters of credit, bankers'  acceptances,
lines of credit, financial  leasing,  and foreign  exchange  transactions. Also included  are commissions  and fees related  to
transactions  in securities  - brokerage,  placements  of issues, underwritings,  redemptions,  and arrangements  of swaps,  options,
and other  hedging  instruments;  commissions  of commodity  futures  traders; and services  related  to asset management,  financial
market  operational  and regulatory  services,  security  custody  services,  etc.
38While these statistics  confinn that commercial  presence  is currently  the most important  mode of
supplying  financial  services, its relative  importance  is likely to differ between sub-sectors. For
instance,  it would seem that consumers  are much less likely to make cross-border  purchases  of life
insurance  than of freight insurance. Similarly,  they are less likely to deposit  money in a bank located
abroad than to borrow money  from a bank located  abroad. We need also to consider  the relative
importance  of cross-border  supply and consumption  abroad. A key difference  between  the two modes
is that under the GATS, commitments  to allow cross-border  supply  of a service oblige a Member to
allow the necessary  capital  movements,  while those to allow  consumption  abroad do not (see Section
I1). Therefore, the former commitments  can be argued to have much  greater value than the latter.
On this basis of these considerations,  and broadly  taking into account the differences  between  the
sectoral  coverage  of the US data and our study, the modal weights  presented  below in Annex  Table 2
were used.  It is recognized,  of course, that these weights  provide only the roughest idea of the relative
importance  of modes, though it can be said, in their defence,  that the results were not very sensitive  to
changes  in their values.
Annex Table 2: Modal Weights in Insurance and Banking
Cross-border  supply  Consumption abroad  Commercial presence
Insurance:
Life  0.12  0.03  0.85
Non-life  0.20  0.05  0.75
Banking:
Deposits  0.12  0.03  0.85
Lending  0.20  0.05  0.75
Quantifying the restrictiveness of measures
39Again  we adopt  the simplest  approach  which enables  us to capture the essence  of the commitments.
With respect  to each mode, a numerical  value of zero was attached  to entries of "unbound"  and a value
of one to entries of "none". The interesting  question  pertains  to how the presence of specific
restrictions  is to be evaluated. In the case of the first two modes, restrictions  often take the form of
excluding  certain sub-sectors  from the scope of the commitment. It is difficult  to judge the economic
significance  of these exclusions. Therefore, a distinction  was not made and a value of 0.5 was attached
in all cases of restrictions  on the first two modes.
With respect  to commercial  presence, a slightly  more sophisticated  approach  was adopted. This was
based on first identifying  the "most  restrictive  measure" specified,  and then applying  a value based on
an assessment  of its restrictiveness. Thus, the presence of any of the following  limitations  led to the
indicated  value  being attached (regardless  of whether  other less restrictive  measures  were also applied):
No new entry or unbound  for new entry  0.10
Discretionary  licensing  for new entry  0.25
Ceiling  on foreign  equity at less than 50%  0.50
Ceiling  on foreign  equity at more than 50%  0.75
Restrictions  on the legal form of commercial  presence  0.75
Other minor restrictions  0.75
Giving a higher  value to the presence of restrictions  than to an entry of "unbound"  reflects the
judgement  that a binding in itself has liberalizing  value (see also Francois and Martin, 1996).
The results
40In each sector, the liberalization  index, L, for each country,j, is defined  as:
LI  = Zw jr 1)  summed over i =  1, 2, 3
where w; is the modal  weight
and ri is the numerical  value of the most restrictive  measure  applied by country  j to mode i.
The liberalization  index  is thus the modal weighted  average of the value of the most restrictive  measure
applied  by a country  to each mode in the sector.
The regional liberalization  indices  were calculated  either as simple  averages of country indices  or as
GDP share weighted  averages. That is:
simple L  =  JLi/n,  summed over j  =  1  ....n,
weighted L  = YgeLj  summed over j =  1....  n,
where n are the number  of countries  in the region,
and gJ  is the share of each country in the region's GDP.
Tables (3) and (5) present the results obtained. Higher values of the liberalization  index indicate  that
commitments  have a greater liberalizing  content.
41Annex Table 3: Liberalization Indices for Banking and Direct Insurance
Country  Banking  Direct Insurance
Accept.  of  Lending  Life Insurance Non-life
Deposits  Insurance
AFRICA  0.65  0.58  0.60  0.58
Angola  0.99  0.03
Egypt, Arab Rep.  0.21  0.19  0.36  0.24
Gabon  0.00  0.44  0.36  0.44
Gambia, The  0.15  0.25  1.00  1.00
Ghana  1.00  1.00  Q.64  0.69
Kenya  1.00  1.00  0.64  0.88
Lesotho  0.64  0.56  0.67  0.61
Malawi  1.00  1.00_
Mauritius  0.21  0.19  0.21  0.19
Morocco  0.85  0.29  0.21  0.19
Mozambique  1.00  1.00
Nigeria  0.64  0.56  0.64  0.66
Senegal  0.64  0.56  0.85  0.75
Sierra Leone  0.79  0.81  0.85  0.75
South Africa  0.85  0.75  0.67  0.61
Tunisia  0.36  0.44  0.64  0.56
Zimbabwe  0.79  0.81  .
ASIA & PACIFIC  0.37  0.43  0.46  0.46
Bahrain  0.58  0.63  1.00  1.00
Brunei  0.24  0.21
Hone Kong  0.46  0.80  0.67  0.59
India  0.21  0.19  0.00  0.10
Indonesia  0.24  0.33  0.85  0.75
Israel  0.85  0.88  0.85  0.75
Korea, Rep.  0.21  0.19  0.43  0.48
Kuwait  0.24  0.34
Macao  0.24  0.24  0.67  0.59
Malaysia  0.12  0.20  0.09  0.20
Pakistan  0.21  0.19  0.64  0.19
Papua New Guinea  1.00  1.00
Philippines  0.24  0.24  0.21  0.29
Qatar  0.15  0.25  0.00  0.25
Singapore  0.12  0.61  0.12  0.10
Solomon Islands  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00
Sri Lanka  0.21  0.19  0.21  0.29
Thailand  0.09  0.08  0.24  0.34
Turkey  0.64  0.56  0.64  0.69
United Arab Emirates  0.15  0.25
EASTERN EUROPE  0.60  0.63  0.52  0.53
Bulgaria  0.64  0.56  0.64  0.66
Czech Republic  0.64  0.81  0.43  0.40
Hungary  0.21  0.19  0.21  0.31
42Annex  Table  3: Liberalization  Indices  for Bank  and Direct  Insurance
Country  Balking  Direct Insurance
Accept. of  Lending  Life  disurance  Non-life
Deposits  Insurance
Poland  0.64  0.56  0.64  0.56
Romania  0.99  0.98  0.64  0.56
Slovak Republic  0.64  0.69  0.43  0.50
Slovenia  0.43  0.63  0.64  0.69
LATIN  AMERICA  0.48  0.45  0.35  0.31
Argentina  0.88  0.80  0.00  0.13
Bolivia  0.64  0.56  0.21  0.19
Brazil  0.21  0.19  0.21  0.29
Chile  0.21  0.19  0.21  0.19
Colombia  0.21  0.19  0.21  0.29
Costa Rica  0.64  0.56
Dominican Republic  0.21  0.19  0.21  0.19
Ecuador  0.24  0.33  0.09  0.08
El Salvador  0.21  0.19
Guyana  1.00  1.00  1.00  1.00
Haiti  1.00  1.00
Honduras  0.21  0.19  0.21  0.19
Jamaica  0.85  0.75  0.21  0.19
Mexico  0.43  0.38  0.43  0.38
Nicaragua  0.21  0.19  0.21  0.19
Panama  1.00  1.00  0.85  0.75
Paraguay  0.85  0.75  0.85  0.75
Peru  0.21  0.19  0.21  0.19
Uruguay  0.21  0.19  0.64  0.19
Venezuela  0.21  0.19  0.21  0.19
DEVELOPED  0.79  0.74  0.71  0.697
Australia  0.67  0.80  0.85  0.69
Canada  0.67  0.61  0.64  0.69
EC  0.67  0.61  0.64  0.69
Iceland  0.88  0.80  0.64  0.59
Japan  0.88  0.80  0.85  0.88
New Zealand  0.88  0.80  0.85  0.69
Norway  0.88  0.80  0.64  0.69
Switzerland  0.88  0.80  0.64  0.69
USA  0.67  0.61  0.64  0.69
ALL COUNTRY  0.54  0.53  0.50  0.49
AVERAGE  ________  _________________
43Table  1:Numerical  summary  of Commitments  on Modes  1,  2 and 3 in  Direct  Insurance  and  Banking  (Acceptance  of Deposits  and  Lending)
(No. and  per  cent  share  of GDP)
Region  Total WTO  Members  Members  Commitments on cross  Commitments  on cross  Commitments  on commercial presence  (mode 3)
Members  with  with full  border  supply (mode 1)  border  supply (mode 2)
commit-  commit-  Linited
(% share of  ments  ments on all  No. of ssrs:  Foreign  Other
GDP of ail  three  modes  FuDl  or Itns.  U, limited,  equity Itns.  significant
Members)  (% share  of  Full  Limited  Full  Limited  Only on the  DL or R  Itns.
GDP of all  legal form
Members in
region)  _  _  _
Direct insurance
3  2
Africa  41  13  1  2  5  5  3  7  (13%)  (5%)
(1.5%)  (80%)  (0%)  (1.7%)  (40%)  62%)  (11%)  (66  %)  1 both (16%)
1  1
Asia and  25  17  2  2  8  3  77  (0.4%)  (24%)
Pacific  (7.6%)  (95%)  (0.3%)  (0.3%)  (68%)  (9%)  (23%)  (32%)  8 both (43 %)
3  1
Eastern  7  7  0  0  5  0  4  2  337%)  (4%)
Europe  (I.I%)  (100%)  (0%)  (0%)  (47%)  (0%)  (43%)  (53%)  37%)  (4%
1 both (6%)
11  2
Latin  32  18  I  1  3  1  1  3  (81%)  (16%)
America  (32%)  (97%)  (0%)  (0%)  (66%)  (0%)  (0%)  (I %)  2 both (I %)
1  86
Total  105  55  4  5  2  1  9  1  5  1  9  (35%)  (18%)
(16.4%)  (95%)  (0.2%)  (0.3%)  (64%)  (9%)  (19%)  (24%)  12 both(22%)
Banking: Acceptance of deposits and lending of all types
51
Africa  4  1  1  8  5  8  4  8  3  10  (10%)  (%
(1.5%)  (84%)  (6%)  (14%)  (13%)  (14%)  (1.5%)  (78%)  2 both (10%)
4  1  1
Asiaand  25  19  2  6  3  10  2  3  (10%)  (037)  (87)
Pacific  (7.6%)  (98%)  (0.3%)  (13%)  (10%)  (26%)  (9%)  (10%  10 both (76%)  8 coexist
Eastem  |  7  7  0  1  3  0  4  5  2  |
Europe  |(1.1%)  (100%)  (0%)  (12%)  (28%)  (0%)  (40%)  (79%)  (21%)  (0%)
Latin  32  20  3  4  0  5  0  8  %  (16  l
America  (6.2%)  (98%)  (0.6%)  (2%)  (0%)  (19%)  (0%)  (20%)  2(20(%)  (0.6%)
Total  105  64  10  19  10  23  8  26  (15o)  (3)|
(16.4%)  (97%)  (1%)  (9%)  (8%)  (16%)  (7%)  (22%)  4bt(3)(4%)
Note: Unless otherwise indicated (as in the second and third columns), percentages for each region are calculated as a share of GDP of all countries with commitments in
the region.  In the rows indicating the totals, percentages are calculated as a share of GDP of all countries with commitments (other than developed countries).
44Table 2:  Market access commitments  under the GATS on insurance (life and non-life)
Region  Full  Commitments  on cross  Commitments  on consump-  Commitments  on commercial presence
commitment  border supply (mode 1)  tion abroad (mode 2)
s on first  Full  Limited  Full  Limited  Full or Uns  Limitations on
three modes  only on the
legal form  Only no. of  Only foreign  Both no. of
suppliers (U,  equity  ssrs. And
Itd, DL, R)  foreign
..  _  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~equity
Africa  Gambia  Gabon,  Egypt,  Egypt,  Ghana,  Gambia,  Gabon,  Ghana,  Egypt
Gambia  Ghana,  Gabon,  Kenya,  Lesotho,  Mauritius,  Kenya
Kenya,  Gambia,  Tunisia  Nigeria,  Morocco
Nigeria,  Lesotho,  Senegal,
Tunisia  South Africa  Sierra
Leone, South
Africa
Asia and  Bahrain,  Bahrain,  India, Korea,  Bahrain,  Brunei D.,  Bahrain,  Qatar  Korea  Brunei D.,
Pacific  Solomon  Solomon  Malaysia,  Solomon  Hong Kong,  Hong Kong,  India,
Islands  Islands  Philippines,  Islands,  macau,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,
Qatar, Sri  Thailand  Malaysia,  Israel,  Pakistan,
Lanka,  Qatar, Sri  Macau,  Philippines,
Thailand,  Lanka,  Solomon  Singapore,
Turkey  Turkey  Islands,  Sri Lanka,
Turkey  Thailand
Eastern  Bulgaria,  Czech  Rep.,  Poland,  Czech  Rep.,  Bulgaria  Slovenia
Europe  Czech Rep.,  Hungary,  Romania  Hungary,
Hungary,  Slovak Rep.,  Slovak Rep.
Slovak Rep.,  Slovenia
Slovenia
Latin  and  Guyana  Guyana  Argentina,  Guyana  Argentina  Guyana,  Argentina,  Cuba,  Dominican
Central  Brazil,  Pnanama,  Bolivia, Brazil,  Mexico  Rep.,






______________  ____________  _____________  _________________________  ___________  V enezuela  y,
45Table  3: Liberalization  indices  for direct insurance  services
Direct  Insurance
Simple  Average  GDP Weighted  Average
Life Insurance  Non-life  Life Insurance  Non-life
Insurance  Insurance
Africa  0.60  0.58  0.50  0.45
Asia  0.46  0.46  0.32  0.35
Eastern  Europe  0.52  0.53  0.53  0.51
Latin  America  0.35  0.31  0.23  0.26
Developed  0.71  0.70  0.68  0.72
All  0.50  0.49  0.62  0.66
46Table 4:  Market access commitments  under  the GATS on banking (acceptance  of depossits and lending of all types)
Region  Full  Commitments  on cross  Commitments  on consump-  Commitments on commercial presence
commitment  border supply (mode 1)  tion abroad (mode 2)
three modes  Full  Limited  Full  Limited  Full or ltns  Limitations on
only on the
legal form  Only no. of  Only foreign  Both no. of
suppliers (U,  equity  ssrs. And
ftd, DL, R)  foreign
equity
Africa  Ghana,  Kenya,  Gambia,  Angola,  Gambia,  Benin,  Gabon  Egypt, Ghana,  Angola,  Benin,  Zimbabwe  Gambia,
Malawi,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Benin,  Gabon,  Ghana,  Kenya,  Kenya,  Gabon,  Morocco
Mozambique,  Malawi,  Morocco  Malawi,  Lesotho,  Morocco,
Sierra  Leone  Mozambique,  Mozambique,  Mozambique,  Mauritius,
Sierra  Leone,  Sierra  Leone,  Sierra  Leone,  Tunisia
Tunisia,  Tunisia,  Nigeria,
Zimbabwe  Zimbabwe  Senegal,  South
Africa
Asia and  PNG,  Bahrain,  Israel,  Bahrain,  Hong  Israel,  Israel,  PNG,  Macau,  UAE,  Bahrain  India,
Pacific  Solomon  Indonesia,  Kuwait,  Kong,  Malaysia  Solomon  Hong  Kong,  Indonesia,
Islands  PNG,  Qatar,  Malaysia  Indonesia,  Islands  Qatar  Korea,
Solomon  Kuwait,  Kuwait,
Islands,  UAE  Macau,  PNG,  Malaysia,
Philippines,  Pakistan,
Qatar,  Philippines,
Solomon  Singapore,  Sri
Islands,  UAE  Lanka,
Thailand
Eastern  Romania  Czech  Rep.,  Czech  Rep.,  Bulgaria,  Hungary,
Europe  Slovak  Rep.,  Romania,  Czech  Rep.,  Slovenia
Slovenia  Slovak  Rep.,  Poland,
Slovenia  Romania,
Slovak  Rep.
Latin and  Guyana,  Haiti,  Ecuador,  Argentina,  Argentina,  Chile, Colombia,  Mexico  Brazil,
Central  Panama  Guyana,  Haiti,  Ecuador,  Bolivia,  Costa  Ecuador,  El  Dominican
America  Panama  Guyana,  Haiti,  Rica, Guyana,  Salvador,  Rep.
Jamaica,  Haiti,  Honduras,
Panama,  Jamaica,  Nicaragua,  Peru,
Paraguay  Panama,  Uruguay,
Paraguay  Venezuela  l
47Table 5: Liberalization  indices for banking (acceptance of deposits and lendin )
Banking
Simple Average  GDP Weighted Average
Acceptance of  Lending  Acceptance of  Lending
Deposits  Deposits
Africa  0.65  0.58  0.63  0.52
Asia  0.37  0.43  0.29  0.30
Eastern Europe  0.60  0.63  0.61  0.61
Latin America  0.48  0.45  0.39  0.35
Developed  0.79  0.74  0.71  0.65
IAll  1  0.54  0.53  0.66  0.61
48Table 6: Grandfather  provisions in GATS Schedules on banking  and insurance  services  (continued)
Country  7  Provision
Foreign  equity-related
Indonesia  Banking  and  insurance:  Share  ownership  of foreign  services  suppliers  is bound  at the prevailing  laws and
regulations.  The conditions  of ownership  and the percentage  share of  ownership  as stipulated  in the
respective  shareholder  agreement  establishing  the existing  individual  joint  venture  shall be respected.  No
transfer  of ownership  shall take place without  the consent  of all parties  in the joint  venture  concerned.
Malaysia  Banking:  Entry  is limited  to equity  participation  by foreign  banks  in Malaysian-owned  or  controlled
commercial  and merchant  banks  with aggregate  foreign  shareholding  not to exceed  30 per  cent,  but the
thirteen  wholly-foreign  owned  commercial  banks are permitted  to remain  wholly-owned  by their  existing
shareholders.
Insurance:  New entry  is limited  to equity participation  by foreign  insurance  companies  in locally  incorporated
insurance  companies  with aggregate  foreign  shareholding  not  to exceed  30 per  cent.  Foreign  shareholding  not
exceeding  51 per  cent is also permitted  when  (i) existing  branches  of foreign  insurance  companies  are locally
incorporated,  which they  are required  to be by 30 June  1998,  and (ii) for  the existing  foreign shareholders  of
locally incorporated  insurance  companies  which were  the original  owners  of these  companies.
Pakistan  Insurance:  Foreign  shareholding  in new life insurance  companies  is limited  to 51 per  cent and in existing  to
25 per  cent, but  the scope  of operations  and equity  structure  of existing  foreign  companies  is guaianteed.
Philip-  Insurance  and banking:  New  investments  of up to 51 per  cent of the voting stock,  but existing  investments
pines  of foreign  banks  will be maintained  at their  existing  levels.
Legal form-related
Brazil  Banking:  Banks  established  before  5 October  1988, are  allowed  to maintain  the aggregate  number  of
branches  that existed  on that  date.  However,  for banks  authorized  to operate  after  that date,  the number  of
branches  is subject  to the conditions  set out,  in each case,  at the time authorization  is granted.
Hong  Banking:  The condition  that branches  of foreign  banks are allowed  to maintain  offices  in one main building
Kong  and no more  than  two additional  offices  in separate  buildings,  does  not apply  to banks  incorporated  outside
Kong  HKSAR  licensed  before  May  1978 in respect  of fully licensed  banks  and before  April  1990 in respect  of
restricted  licence  banks.
Indonesia  Banking:  Existing  branches  of foreign  banks  are exempted  from  the requirement  imposed  on new entrants  to
be in the form  of locally  incorporated  joint  venture  banks.
Malaysia  Insurance:  Branching  is only permitted  for direct  insurance  companies  with aggregate  foreign  shareholding
of less than 50 per  cent but companies  are permitted  to maintain  their  existing  network  of branches.  (See
also foreign  equity-related  provision  above.)
Pakistan  Banking:  While new  entrants  are  obliged to incorporate  locally,  the rights  of existing  branches  of  foreign
banks are guaranteed.
Thailand  Banking:  While the establishment  of new branches  is subject  to discretionary  licensing,  existing  foreign
banks which  already  had the first  branch  office  in Thailand  prior  to July  1995 will each  be permitted  to open
no more  than  two additional  branches.
General
Philip-  Insurance:  Limitations  in  market  access  listed  in  the  specific  insurance  sub-sectors  do  niot apply  to  existing
pie  wholly  or  majority  foreign-owned  authorized  insurance/reinsurance  companies  as  of  the  entry  intci  force  of
pmes  ~the  WTO  Financial  Services  agreement.Table 7:  Precommitments  to future liberalization and standstill commitments under GATS in banking and
insurance
Country  Commitment
Egypt  Insurance:  relaxation of economic needs test in the year 2000 for life and 2002 for non-life
insurance;  foreign equity limit increased from 49 per cent to 51 per cent as of 1 January 2000
for life and 1 January 2003 for non-life.
India  Banking:  12 branch licenses per year both for new entrants and existing banks;  subject to 15
per cent maximum share of foreign assets to the total assets of the banking system.
Indonesia  Insurance and banking: all limitations will be eliminated by the year 2020 subject to a similar
commitment by other Members.
Korea  Insurance and banking: standstill for all market access limitations as of 31 August 1997.
Philippines  Banking:  10 new licenses for bank branches for the period 1995-2000.
Thailand  Banking:  discretionary higher equity participation in banks than bound 25 per cent maximum
for a period of 10 years, grandfathered thereafter for the absolute amount of equity held.
Bulgaria  Insurance:  majority foreign ownership in insuraice will be allowed 3 years after accession.
Czech Republic  Insurance:  endeavour to eliminate or reduce scope of monopoly rights in compulsory
insurance under Paragraph Al  of the Understanding on Financial Services.
Hungary  Insurance:  market access for branches of insurance companies on adoption of legislation.
Poland  Insurance and banking: as of 1 January 1999, market access through licensed branches of
banks and insurance companies will be allowed.
Slovak Republic  Insurance:  endeavour to eliminate or reduce scope of monopoly rights in compulsory
insurance under Paragraph Al  of the Understanding on Financial Services.
Slovenia  Insurance: 99 per cent limitation on foreign ownership of insurance companies will be
abolished with the adoption of relevant law.
Banking:  branch banking will be allowed, and elements of discretionary licensing removed,
after adoption of the new Banking Law.
Brazil  Insurance:  commercial presence in work accident insurance, reinsurance and retrocession will
be allowed within two years of adoption of legislation
Banking:  national treatment for commercial presence for services of credit cards and factoring
within two years of adoption of legislation.
Nigeria, Turkey,  Insurance and banking: standstill under Paragraph A of the Understanding on Financial
Bulgaria, Czech  services.
Republic, Hungary,
Slovak Republic  l
Sri Lanka  Banking:  standstill under Paragraph A of the Understanding on Financial services.
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